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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article will focus on the relationship between Chapter 11 
and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 A number of issues are 
similar or identical in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. Furthermore, 
much of the language of Chapter 13 mirrors that of Chapter 11. 
This Article explores whether courts should apply case law and 
concepts of one chapter when similar issues arise in proceedings 
under the other chapter. 
Parts II and III of this Article address basic similarities and 
differences between Chapters 11 and 13. Parts IV, V, and VI ex-
amine three issues governed by statutory language common to 
both chapters. Part IV discusses the discount factor applied in de-
termining present value of deferred cash payments in a Chapter 11 
or Chapter 13 plan. Part V analyzes the grounds for relief from an 
*Dean, Emory University School of Law, formerly Joseph C. Hutcheson Professor of 
Law, University of Texas. 
**Associate, Scott, Douglass & Luton; Austin, Texas. The authors wish to acknowledge 
the significant editorial assistance provided by the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review. 
1. Title 11 of the United States Code contains the substantive law of bankruptcy. The 
statute is divided into eight chapters: 
Chapter 1, General Provisions, Definitions and Rules of Construction; 
Chapter 3, Case Administration; 
Chapter 5, Creditors, the Debtor and the Estate; 
Chapter 7, Liquidation; 
Chapter 9, Adjustments of the Debt of a Municipality; 
Chapter 11, Reorganization; 
Chapter 13, Adjustment of the Debts of an Individual with Regular Income; and 
Chapter 15, United State Trustees. 
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automatic stay. Part VI addresses the classification, under either 
chapter, of "substantially similar" claims. 
II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CHAPTERS 11 AND 13 
There are some obvious similarities between Chapters 11 and 
13. For example, the provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 generally 
apply in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases.2 Usually, both 
chapters are described as debtor rehabilitation chapters. In the 
typical Chapter 11 or 13 case, the debtor retains her assets after 
filing a bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, both chapters follow the 
same general procedure. The debtor prepares a plan of rehabilita-
tion or repayment. The court reviews the plan. The plan becomes 
e:ff ective after approval or confirmation by the bankruptcy judge. 
Finally, pursuant to this court approved plan, the debtor makes 
payments or other distributions to the creditors, usually from her 
postpetition earnings. 
ill. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHAPTERS 11 AND 13 
Some obvious differences distinguish the commencement of a 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 case. A Chapter 11 case can be volun-
tary or involuntary. Thus, either a debtor or its creditors can file a 
Chapter 11 petition.3 In contrast, every Chapter 13 case is volun-
tary.4 Thus, a debtor must choose to file for Chapter 13 relief. 
Only certain debtors can choose to file under Chapter 13. The 
use of Chapter 13 is subject to debt limitations and restricted to 
individuals.5 Partnerships and corporations cannot file for relief 
under Chapter 13. Although an individual who is operating a busi-
ness as a sole proprietorship6 or conducting a professional practice7 
can file a Chapter 13 petition, most Chapter 13 debtors are "con-
sumer debtors." In contrast, Chapter 11 is not limited to individu-
als, partnerships, or corporations. Any "person" is eligible for relief 
under Chapter 11. Although a "consumer debtor" can file a Chap-
2. 11 U:S.C. § 103(a) (1982). 
3. Id. §§ 301, 303. 
4. Id. § 303(a) ("An involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or II 
of this title .... "). 
5. Id. § 109(e). 
6. See In re Trombley, 34 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. D. Ver. 1983). See generally Moller, It 
Isn't Only for Wage Earners Anymore: The Individual in Business and Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REV. 331 (1980). 
7. See In re Ballard, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); Kaplan, 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Attractive Alternative, 28 DE PAUL 
L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1979). 
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ter 11 petition,8 most Chapter 11 debtors are businesses, farmers, 
investors, or professionals. 
The differences between Chapters 11 and 13 are not limited to 
the commencement of the case. The chapters typically involve dif-
ferent participants. Every Chapter 13 case has a trustee-usually a 
standing trustee.9 Generally, there will not be a trustee in a Chap-
ter 11 case.10 Every Chapter 11 case, however, has a creditors' com-
mittee whose statutory duties permit it to "consult with the trus-
tee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the 
case,'' and "participate in the formulation of the plan."11 
When a trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 case, her duties 
are very different from the trustee's duties in a Chapter 13 case.12 
The Chapter 11 trustee takes possession of the property of the es-
tate and operates the business of the debtor. The Chapter 13 trus-
tee does not have this power.13 A Chapter 11 trustee also has the 
responsibility for the formulation of the reorganization plan.14 In 
Chapter 13, only the debtor can file a plan.15 
The role of creditors in the two chapters also is very different. 
As noted above, there is a creditors committee in Chapter 11 that 
is involved in both the administration of the case and the formula-
tion of the plan. A Chapter 11 plan is submitted to creditors for 
vote.16 Chapter 11 creditors can accept or reject the debtor's or 
trustee's plan, or submit their own plan. A Chapter 11 plan does 
not have to receive the affirmative approval of all or even a major-
ity of all creditors. The requisite majority of at least one class of 
creditors, however, must approve the plan in a Chapter 11 case.17 
8. See, e.g., In re Gregory, 39 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Woodhouse, 
7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). But see In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4 
Bankr. 226, 231 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980). 
9. 11 u.s.c. § 1302 (1982). 
10. Id. § 1104. See generally Berdan and Arnold, Displacing the Debtor in Possession: 
The Requisites and Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceed-
ings, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 457 (1984). 
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103(c)(l), (3) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 
333 (1984). See generally Blain and Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers and Duties, 67 MARQ. L. 
REV. 491 (1984). 
12. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106, 1108 (-1982) with id. § 1302. See generally Peep-
les, Five into Thirteen: Lien Avoidance in Chapter 13, 61 N.C. L. REV. 849, 868-71 (1983) 
(discussing a Chapter 13 trustee's avoidance powers). 
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1982). 
14. Id. § 1106(a)(5). 
15. Id. § 1321. 
16. Id. §§ 1125, 1126, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
17. Id. § 1129, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
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In contrast, Chapter 13 provides no creditors' committee, no credi-
tors' vote, and no possibility for a creditors' plan.18 
While both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 require that the judge 
approve the plan, some of the confirmation standards are differ-
ent.19 Furthermore, the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan 
is different from the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. In 
Chapter 11, confirmation effects a discharge. 20 This discharge 
means that when the court approves the Chapter 11 plan, the 
debtor's obligations on his prepetition debts are limited to what 
was called for by the plan. Confirmation in a Chapter 11 case also 
simultaneously terminates the automatic stay.21 Confirmation of a 
Chapter 13 plan does not automatically terminate the stay. Chap-
ter 13 does not allow a discharge until the debtor completes her 
payments under the plan or receives a hardship discharge. 22 
Finally, there are differences between a Chapter 11 and a 
Chapter 13 discharge. An individual debtor's Chapter 13 discharge 
is more comprehensive than a Chapter 11 discharge. A Chapter 11 
discharge is subject to all the exceptions set out in section 523(a).23 
On the other hand, if a Chapter 13 debtor completes the payments 
called for by her plan, the discharge will be subject only to the 
section 523(a)(5) exception for family obligations.24 
18. Id. §§ 1324, 1325, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
19. Id. §§ 1129, 1325. For example, Chapter 13 requires that the plan either provide 
for full payment of all unsecured claims or commit all of the debtor's "disposable income" 
to the plan. Chapter 11 contains no comparable test. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (to be codified at 11 
U.S.C. § 1325(b)); see infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
20. 11 u.s.c. § 1141(d) (1982). 
21. Id. § 362(c)(2)(C). 
22. Id. § 1328. While confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan does not effect a termination 
of the automatic stay, it does affect the grounds for relief from the stay. Courts have held 
that confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan prevents the use of § 362(d)(2) and limits "cause" 
for purposes of § 362(d)(l) to matters occurring after the confirmation. See, e.g., In re 
Clark, 38 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Lewis, 8 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
1981). The reasoning supporting these holdings is that the plain language of § 1327(a) viti-
ates the applicability of§ 362(d)(2). See Clark, 38 Bankr. at 684; Lewis, 8 Bankr. at 136-37. 
Section 1327 states: "The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, 
whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not 
such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) 
(1982). 
23. 11 U.S.C. § 114l(d)(2) (1982); see Lander, An Analysis and Comparison of the 
Nondischargeability Provisions of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 27 
ST. Lours U. L.J. 639, 643 (1983). 
24. Defalcation claims, educational obligations, and other debts excepted from dis-
charge by § 523 will still be discharged under § 1328. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982), as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
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Though this section of the Article has listed many differences 
between Chapters 11 and 13-differences that may profoundly af-
fect the rehabilitation process-the case authority from one chap-
ter still offers some precedential value to like issues arising in pro-
ceedings under the other chapter. The rest of this Article examines 
the applicability of this precedent as well as the inherent limits on 
its applicability. 
IV. THE RATE OF INTEREST REQUffiED BY "VALUE, AS OF THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE PLAN" 
In both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, the plan can provide for 
periodic payments. Chapter 13 plans generally provide for pay-
ments over a three year period. The court, however, can approve a 
Chapter 13 plan that has a five year payment period.25 There is no 
statutory limitation on the payment period of a Chapter 11 plan: 
both three and five year plans are common. 
Obviously, payment of X dollars over a three to five year pe-
riod is less valuable to a creditor than an immediate cash payment 
of X dollars. Accordingly, both section 1129 of Chapter 11 and sec-
tion 1325 of Chapter 13 test the adequacy of a plan's deferred cash 
payments to the holder of a secured claim by looking to the "value, 
as of the effective date of the plan" of the deferred cash payments. 
The statutory language is exactly the same in both chapters.26 
Most of the reported cases interpreting this phrase have arisen 
under Chapter 13. Should a court look to and rely on these Chap-
ter 13 present value cases in determining whether a Chapter 11 
plan meets the present value test of section 1129? 
Recently, a bankruptcy court in Utah considered that general 
question at length in In re Loveridge Machine & Tool Co.27 In 
Loveridge, the Chapter 11 debtors owed Northwest, a trade credi-
tor, $448,807. The contract creating the debt provided for nineteen 
percent interest. Northwest's claim was secured by equipment, in-
ventory, and accounts. The parties agreed that the collateral's 
value was greater than the amount of Northwest's claim. Debtors 
and Northwest, however, did not agree on how debtors' Chapter 11 
plan should treat Northwest's secured claim. The plan classified 
Northwest's claim in a separate class28 and proposed to pay North-
25. Id. § 1322(c). 
26. Compare id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) with id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
27. 36 Bankr. 159, 168-69 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983). 
28. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 on classifi-
cation, see infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text. 
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west the full amount of its secured claim, including legal fees and 
interest, over a six to seven year period. Northwest disagreed only 
with the plan's proposed interest rate on its fully secured claim. 
The interest rate was to be measured by "the Legal Rate as de-
fined in 28 USC Section 1961." 
To confirm the plan over Northwest's dissent, bankruptcy 
Judge Glen Clark had to determine whether paying interest at a 
rate measured by 28 USC section 196l(a) met the "value, as of the 
effective date of the plan" test of section 1129(b). 28 USC section 
196l(a) governs the interest rate of money judgments in federal 
civil cases. 29 A number of bankruptcy cases have held that a plan 
providing for posteff ective date interest at a rate tied to 28 USC 
section 196l(a) satisfies the "value, as of the effective date of the 
plan" test. 30 Most of these cases are Chapter 13 cases. 
The Loveridge court rejected these precedents and denied the 
debtors' motion for confirmation. Judge Clark questioned the ap-
plicability of the present value analysis in Chapter 13 cases to the 
consideration of the proper discount rate for deferred payments to 
an objecting holder of a secured claim under a Chapter 11 plan. 
The Loveridge opinion set out several differences between Chapter 
11 and Chapter 13 to justify reading the phrase "value, as of the 
effective date of the plan" differently in Chapter 11 cases than in 
Chapter 13 cases. 
A. Statutory Language 
The Loveridge court first noted that section 1129(b)(l) has a 
"fair and equitable" rule while section 1325(a)(5) does not. The 
court stated that "[t]his unique Chapter 11 requirement may, in 
some cases, dictate interest rates different from those which would 
be applied in a pure present value analysis."31 The court provided 
no support for this statement, and the authors are unable to find 
any. The phrase "fair and equitable" has a long bankruptcy his-
tory. The standard was used in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 and was construed as requiring absolute priority among 
classes of claims and interests according to their ranks. 32 Courts 
29. Interest is based on treasury bill rates. The Director of the Administrative Office 
of United States Courts distributes notices of the prevailing rates to federal judges. 
30. E.g., In re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 31 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) 
(Chapter 11 case); In re Jewel, 25 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (Chapter 13 case). 
31. 36 Bankr. at 168. 
32. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Northern 
Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 1129.03(2) (L. 
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and commentators generally describe the fair and equitable stan-
dard as an absolute priority rule. Under this description, Lover-
idges' Chapter 11 plan was fair and equitable respecting North-
west's secured claim if Northwest was to be paid in full before 
unsecured creditors and other junior classes of claims and interests 
received anything. 
Although the phrase "fair and equitable" controls the order in 
which claims are paid, it would not seem to affect the rate of post-
effective date interest as the Loveridge Court suggested. Therefore, 
the "fair and equitable' component in Chapter 11 would not seem 
to justify interpreting "value, as of the effective date of the plan" 
differently in Chapter 11 cases than in Chapter 13 cases. 
B. Risks of Nonpayment 
The Loveridge court's seco;nd reason for discounting Chapter 
13 case authority on interest rates in applying section 1129(b) is 
that the "risk of nonpayment in Chapter 13 [is] significantly differ-
ent from the risk of nonpayment in Chapter 11."33 As Judge Clark 
points out, in Chapter 13 a standing trustee is statutorily obligated 
to collect and disburse payments.34 In most Chapter 11 cases, there 
is no trustee. Furthermore, "Chapter 13 debtors who complete 
their plans receive a broader discharge than individual debtors in 
Chapter 11."35 Because of this more comprehensive discharge, 
Chapter 13 debtors have a greater incentive than Chapter 11 debt-
ors to complete their payments. No meaningful empirical studies 
compare the risks of nonpayment faced by holders of secured 
claims in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases. The legal factors con-
sidered in Loveridge suggest that Chapter 13 may present lower 
risks. Other legal factors, however, suggest that Chapter 11 
presents lower risks. If a Chapter 11 debtor fails to make payments 
under a Chapter 11 plan, the affected creditors can bring collection 
actions in any federal or state court with jurisdiction. Since the 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan effects a discharge, the auto-
matic stay automatically terminates as soon as a Chapter 11 plan is 
confirmed.36 The debtor's failure to make payments under a Chap-
ter 13 plan has different consequences. Before bringing the collec-
King 15th ed. 1984). 
33. 36 Bankr. at 168. 
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(5) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 
(1984). 
35. 36 Bankr. at 168; see also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C) (1982). 
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tion action in a Chapter 13 case, the affected creditors must file a 
motion with the bankruptcy court to obtain relief from the auto-
matic stay. 37 
Dean Nimmer of the University of Houston Law Center sug-
gests another reason that creditors have lower risks in business 
Chapter 11 cases than in consumer Chapter 13 cases: "In both 
cases, the sole bankruptcy alternative is a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
For businesses, however, liquidation terminates the effective exis-
tence of the entity and sacrifices perceived opportunities to salvage 
going concern value from assets. In contrast, an individual remains 
a functioning economic unit after liquidation."38 Thus, the Chapter 
11 business debtor may be less likely to convert from rehabilitation 
to liquidation with the attendant possibility that the creditor will 
get less. 
C. Tax Cases 
The Loveridge court noted that "most of the Chapter 13 opin-
ions [on interest rates] deal with creditors secured by liens on cars 
or tax creditors. "39 The court was right to distinguish Chapter 13 
tax cases from Loveridge. The Internal Revenue Service and other 
taxing authorities are not bound by the same constraints or moti-
vated by the same goals as private creditors. Therefore, tax cases 
should not be controlling precedent against nontax creditors like 
Northwestern. 
Section 1129 implicitly recognizes the special nature of tax 
claims. Section 1129(a)(9)(C) separately deals with tax claims. 
While section 1129(a)(9)(C), like section 1129(b), contains the 
phrase "values as of the effective date of the plan," cases under 
section 1129(a)(9)(C) have little precedential value to cases under 
section 1129(b). Similarly, Chapter 13 cases applying section 
1325(a)(5) to tax claims should not be controlling in either Chapter 
11 or Chapter 13 cases involving nontax claims;'0 
37. See supra note-22 and accompanying text. 
38. See Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in Behav-
ioral Economics, 1983 ARrz. ST. L.J. 281. 
39. 36 Bankr. at 168. 
40. In bankruptey cases, the Internal Revenue Service has been vigilant and reasona-
bly successful in demanding a present value discount based on § 6621 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which governs the interest charge on delinquent taxes. See, e.g., In re Fi-Hi 
Pizza, Inc., 40 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (Chapter 11 proceeding); In re Stafford, 
24 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). Nonetheless, perhaps § 6621 should not be used in 
bankruptcy to determine the "value, as of the effective date of tbe plan" of tax claims. In re 
Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983), makes a strong argument against such use: 
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D. Uniform Interest Rate for All Cases 
The Loveridge court's final reason for not following Chapter 
13 case law on "value, as of the effective date of the plan" is that 
many Chapter 13 cases on "value, as of the effective date of the 
plan" attempt to set a uniform interest rate to be applied in all 
cases;n Because of the $350,000 secured debt limit imposed by sec-
tion 109(e), Chapter 13 cases will always involve relatively small 
dollar amounts. For reasons of administrative convenience and fi-
nancial necessity, many jurisdictions use a uniform interest rate in 
applying section 1325(a)(5);'2 Courts that utilize this constant rate 
make little or no distinction between the types of claims or the 
feasibility of the proposed plan. 
Whether this uniform rate approach is appropriate even in 
Chapter 13 cases is questionable. The risks that a creditor incurs 
in waiting for payment should be a factor in determining whether 
the proposed periodic payments have a "value, as of the effective 
date of the plan" of the allowed amount of such claim. Although 
plans must meet feasibility standards, thus signifying that the 
bankruptcy court has determined that the plan likely will succeed, 
"some plans are more feasible than others. ""3 Therefore, even a 
Chapter 13 court should build the secured creditors' risks of loss 
into interest rate determinations on a case by case basis. 
While considerations of convenience and economy might, 
nonetheless, off er some justifications for disregarding differences in 
creditor risk in some Chapter 13 cases, they are not applicable in 
most Chapter 11 cases. A Chapter 11 case can involve creditors 
with single secured claims far larger than the total amount of se-
cured claims permitted in Chapter 13. Chapter ll's requirements 
of creditors' committees and creditors' voting on plans also indi-
cate that considerations of convenience and economy are less com-
pelling in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 13. 
Judge Clark in Loveridge concluded his comparison of Chap-
ter 13 cases on "value, as of the effective date of the plan" with 
The IRS does not set its section 6621 rate of interest based on any of the advocated 
factors such as duration, collateral, and risk of default. The IRS bas determined that 
its rate of interest must be high enough to deter tax evasion, restrict creative tax avoid-
ance, and to compel timely tax payment and reporting. 
Id. at 545. 
41. 36 Bankr. at 168. 
42. See, e.g., In re Jewel, 25 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Johnson, 8 Bankr. 
503 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981). 
43. See In re Fi-Hi Pizza, Inc., 40 Bankr. 258, 271 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). 
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Chapter 11 cases by stating: "The Chapter 13 opinions are not the 
last word on present value issues in Chapter 11 cases. Put simply, 
the Chapter 13 opinions should not inspire courts to avoid hard 
thinking about present value issues in Chapter 11 cases."44 While 
the Loveridge opinion provides support for this statement, it also 
provides support for the statement that Chapter 13 opinions are 
not the last word on present value issues in Chapter 13 cases. The 
present Chapter 13 opinions should not prevent courts from hard 
thinking about present value in Chapter 13 cases. Many of the rea-
sons that the Loveridge court gave for not following Chapter 13 
present value cases in Chapter 11 cases undercut the validity of 
the court's assumptions about Chapter 13, not the applicability of 
an approach that is valid in Chapter 13 cases to Chapter 11 cases. 
V. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN CHAPTERS 
11AND13 
The filing of any bankruptcy petition-Chapters 7, 11, or 
13-triggers the automatic stay of section 362. Under section 362, 
a creditor is barred from proceeding against the debtor or its col-
lateral without first obtaining permission from the bankruptcy 
court. 
An important factor in assessing the impact of the automatic 
stay on a creditor is the time period that the automatic stay is in 
effect. Section 362(c)(2)(C) provides that the automatic stay auto-
matically terminates when a discharge is granted. Thus, in a Chap-
ter 11 case, the automatic stay ends when the plan is confirmed 
because confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan effects a discharge. Con-
firmation of a Chapter 13 plan, on the other hand, does not have 
this effect. Because the confirmation does not result in a discharge, 
it does not automatically terminate the automatic stay. 
Frequently, in a Chapter 11 case, a year or two will pass be-
tween the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the confirmation of 
the plan. During this time period, the automatic stay bars the 
creditor from pursuing the debtor on prepetition obligations, and 
the debtor has no commitments to pay the creditor under the plan 
because it is not yet in place. Furthermore, the creditor cannot 
draw interest on its claim unless the value of the collateral secur-
ing its claim is greater than the amount of its debt. Except for the 
provision in section 506(b) for the over-secured creditor, the run-
ning of interest stops when the petition is filed. 
44. 36 Bankr. at 168. 
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In a Chapter 13 case, it would be very unusual for a year to 
pass between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the 
plan. A Chapter 13 plan must be filed within fifteen days after the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. In Chapter 13, unlike Chapter 11, 
the plan is not voted on by creditors. The delays in confirmation of 
a Chapter 13 plan are usually caused by the caseload of the court. 
An aggrieved creditor can file a motion with the bankruptcy 
court requesting relief from the automatic stay. The relief can take 
the form of an end to the automatic stay or the imposition of con-
ditions or restrictions on the continuation of the automatic stay. 
Section 362(d) sets out the grounds for this relief. The language of 
section 362(d) is the statutory language that controls motions for 
relief from the automatic stay in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 
cases. While the statutory language is the same, whether courts 
should interpret the language of section 362(d) similarly in Chap-
ter 11 and Chapter 13 cases is open to question. 
A. Section 362( d) (1) 
Section 362(d)(l) provides for relief from the automatic stay 
"for cause." "Cause" is not statutorily defined. The statute does, 
however, provide an example of "cause": "the lack of adequate 
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest."'u' 
Many Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases have applied this language 
to requests for relief from stay by creditors with secured claims. 
That the adequate protection requirement is directed to a secured 
creditor's interest in its collateral, not its interest in the repayment 
of the underlying debt now seems well settled.46 It is not, however, 
well settled what interest in the collateral is to be adequately pro-
tected, or what is required to adequately protect that interest. 
Some of the leading cases addressing these issues concern Chapter 
11. The question here considered is the extent to which this Chap-
ter 11 case law should be followed in Chapter 13 cases concerning 
section 362(d)(l). 
45. 11 u.s.c. § 362(d)(l) (1982). 
46. Assume, for example, that D, who is now in bankruptcy, owes C $320,000 and this 
$320,000 debt is secured by equipment with a value of $110,000. Section 362(d)(l) requires 
adequate protection of C's interest in the $110,000 of collateral, but does not protect C's 
right of repayment of the $320,000 debt. 
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1. Opportunity Costs 
A number of recent Chapter 11 cases have considered whether 
adequate protection includes compensation for lost opportunity 
costs.47 Assume, for example, that D owes C $370,000 and the debt 
is secured by collateral with a stable value of $110,000. C argues 
that, but for bankruptcy and the automatic stay, it would: (i) fore-
close on its collateral, (ii) sell the collateral for $110,000, (iii) rein-
vest the $110,000 of proceeds, and (iv) earn and be paid interest on 
the $110,000. C thus contends that one of the costs of the stay is 
this lost opportunity, and that its rights in the collateral are not 
being adequately protected unless it is compensated for this loss. 
Most of the bankruptcy courts that have considered such ar-
guments have rejected them.48 Recently, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit became the first circuit court to consider the opportunity cost 
issue. The Ninth Circuit held in In re American Mariner Indus-
tries, Inc.49 that adequate protection does include compensation 
for lost opportunities. The case involved facts very similar to those 
outlined in the above hypothetical: a Chapter 11 debtor and a par-
tially secured creditor whose "collateral was not depreciating."50 
The creditor claimed that its interest in the collateral would be 
adequately protected as contemplated by section 362(d)(l) only if 
it received periodic payments equal to its prospective return from 
47. See, e.g., In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) (in 
favor of the requirement); In re Aegean Fare, Inc., 34 Bankr. 965 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) 
(rejecting the requirement); In re Shriver, 33 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (re-
jecting); In re Pine Lake Village Apartments Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(rejecting); In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (rejecting); 
In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (granting such protection). 
48. See In re Cantrup, 32 Bankr. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. Colo. 1983). 
49. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). 
50. Id. at 428. In American Mariner, Crocker National Bank was an undersecured 
creditor with a debt of $370,000 secured hy $110,000 of collateral. Crocker moved for ade-
quate protection after American Mariner filed its petition. Crocker alleged that, because it 
had a state law right to seize and sell the collateral, the automatic stay prevented it from 
earning interest on the proceeds of the sale of collateral. The bankruptcy court found that 
the collateral was not depreciating and was necessary for an effective reorganization. A di-
vided bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the lower court's rejection of adequate protection 
for lost opportunity costs. 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). The debtor had offered to 
pay "interest on the value of the collateral" of $1770 per month. The bankruptcy court 
conditioned the continuation of the stay on such payment, stating: "Although I hold that no 
interest is due and although no evidence of economic depreciation has been presented, I find 
that the $1770 per month is adequate protection for any depreciation or depletion of the 
collateral that may occur." In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1981). Crocker appealed. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with orders that 
the debtor structure some proposal that would adequately protect Cracker's interest. In re 
American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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the reinvestment of the liquidation value of the collateral. Both 
the bankruptcy court111 and a divided bankruptcy appellate panel112 
rejected this contention. The Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that the creditor is "entitled to compensation for 
the delay in enforcing its rights during the interim between the 
petition and the confirmation of the plan."113 
In reaching this holding, the Ninth Circuit considered: (i) the 
phrase "indubitable equivalent," which appears in section 361(3)'s 
list of examples of adequate protection; (ii) Judge Hand's opinion 
using the language "indubitable equivalence" to define adequate 
protection in In re Murel Holding Corp.,54 a case under section 
77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; (iii) the use of the phrase "in-
dubitable equivalent" in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); and (iv) bank-
ruptcy court decisions rejecting opportunity costs arguments in 
Chapter 11 cases.1515 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in American Mari-
ner does not mention Chapter 13 or consider Chapter 13 
authority.156 
51. 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). 
52. 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). 
53. 734 F.2d at 435. 
54. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J.). 
Murel concerned a proposed plan for repaying the mortgagee of an apartment house. 
The debtors' plan proposed that the mortgagee forego amortization payments and extend 
the due date of the mortgage while the debtors renovated the apartment house to make it 
more readily leasahle. After the mortgagee rejected the plan, the court had to decide 
whether or not the owner's plan provided adequato protection before the court could con-
firm the plan over the mortgagee's objection. Judge Hand explained the concept of adequate 
protection: 
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely compensatory; and that pay-
ment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed 
the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his princi-
pal will scarcely he content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the prop-
erty. We see no reason to suppose that the statuto was intended to deprive him of that 
in the interest of junior holders, unless by substitute of the most ihdubitable 
equivalence. 
Id. at 942 (emphasis added). The Murel court rejected the plan because it determined that 
the plan had little hope of success and thus did not afford the mortgagee adequato protec-
tion. Id. at 943. 
Judge Hand's explanation of "adequate protection" was given new significance hy con-
gressional reports indicating that "[t]he indubitable equivalent language is intended to fol-
low the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5913. 
55. See supra note 47. 
56. Consider the consequences of applying the American Mariner rule to the most 
common Chapter 13 adequate protection fact situation. D, the Chapter 13 debtor, owes C 
$10,000 on her car note. Chas a perfected security interest in D's car. The car has a value of 
$6000 and this value is declining at a rate of $300. C files a motion requesting relief from the 
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Since the American Mariner decision was decided on June 4, 
1984, several Chapter 11 cases have relied on American Mariner to 
hold that when the automatic stay prevents a creditor from repos-
sessing its collateral, the creditor is entitled, under the concept of 
adequate protection, to compensation for this delay in enforcing its 
rights. 57 At least one Chapter 11 case has expressly rejected Ameri-
can Mariner.58 To date, no reported Chapter 13 case has consid-
ered American Mariner. 
Is there any reas9n to limit American Mariner to Chapter 11 
cases? The Ninth Circuit looked to the "indubitable equivalent" 
language in section 361(3) in interpreting the phrase "adequate 
protection" in section 362(d)(l). Section 361(3), like section 
362(d)(l), applies in Chapter 13 cases as well as Chapter 11 cases. 
The argument that American Mariner should not be followed 
in either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 cases is easier to make than the 
argument that American Mariner should be followed only in 
Chapter 11 cases. A first difficulty American Mariner presents lies 
in distinguishing "opportunity costs" from postpetition interest. 
Arguably, American Mariner creates a conflict with section 
506(b)'s dictate that only fully secured claims accrue interest dur-
ing the period between the filing of the petition and the confirma-
tion of the plan. 59 
How is opportunity costs compensation di:ff erent from inter-
est? While the American Mariner opinion avoids using the term 
"interest," it acknowledges that "monthly interest payments at the 
market rate on the liquidation value of the collateral" is a permis-
sible form of adequate protection for opportunity costs. 60 A later 
opportunity costs decision, Grundy National Bank v. Tandem 
Mining Corp.,61 is more direct. It relies on American Mariner to 
hold that a creditor is entitled to interest. 62 
A second problem that American Mariner creates is the possi-
stay. Under American Mariner, D would have to make periodic payments to C to cover the 
depreciation on the car and provide compensation for lost opportunity costs in order to 
satisfy the adequate protection standard of § 362(d)(l). 
57. See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 
1985); In re Mary Harpley Builder, Inc., 44 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). 
58. BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 70,139 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). 
59. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). But cf. Note, Compensation for Time Value as Part of 
Adequate Protection During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 
321-22 (1983) (arguing that§ 506(b) does not affect the right of undersecured creditors to 
adequate protection). 
60. 734 F.2d at 435. 
61. 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985). 
62. Id. at 1441. 
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bility that a creditor that is only partially secured will be treated 
more favorably than a creditor that is fully secured. Under Ameri-
can Mariner, a creditor whose debt is partially secured is entitled 
to periodic payments to cover lost opportunity costs. Under section 
506(b), the fully secured creditor's claim will accrue postpetition 
interest, but the fully secured creditor will not immediately receive 
this postpetition interest. Section 506(b) does not contemplate that 
holders of fully secured claims will be paid X dollars each month. 
Instead, the fully secured creditor's claim will increase by X dol-
lars each month. 
Does American Mariner contemplate that fully secured credi-
tors also must receive opportunity cost payments as a part of ade-
quate protection? Has a creditor whose claim is continuing to draw 
interest been deprived of an opportunity cost? At least one post-
American Mariner decision from a bankruptcy court in the Ninth 
Circuit has answered the latter question in the negative and denied 
the opportunity cost claim of a fully secured creditor.63 This hold-
ing means that a partially secured creditor, but not a fully secured 
creditor, can demand periodic payments as a condition to the con-
tinuation of the automatic stay. 
2. Role of the Bankruptcy Judge in Adequate Protection Litigation 
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules spe-
cifically describe the role that the bankruptcy judge is to play in 
section 362(d)(l) litigation in which the issue is whetlier the credi-
tor seeking relief from the automatic stay is adequately protected. 
There is, however, some relevant legislative history. Both the 
House report and the Senate report accompanying the bills that 
became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 state that the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not require courts to provide an adequate pro-
tection proposal. The court's role is only to determine whether the 
trustee's or debtor's proposal meets the "adequate protection" 
standard. 64 
63. See In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 43 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984) (Wil-
liams, Mag.). In Sun Valley Ranches, the creditor's first petition for relief was denied on the 
basis of the bankruptcy apellate panel's decision in American Mariner, which the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 
The Sun Valley court denied the opportunity cost claim because it reasoned that a 
fully secured creditor with an equity cushion is already adequately protected. The court 
concluded that American Mariner intended to provide only the undersecured creditor with 
adequate protection similar to that given to fully secured creditors under § 506(b). 
64. H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
An. NEWS 5963, 6295. The House Report provides: 
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Unfortunately, the legislative reports do not indicate what 
should happen if the court decides that the protection provided is 
not adequate. What if, for example, a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 
debtor proposes monthly payments of X dollars to cover the de-
preciation of a creditor's collateral, but the bankruptcy court de-
cides that X dollars is not adequate? Should the bankruptcy court 
terminate the automatic stay or condition the continuation of the 
automatic stay on payments in an amount that the court deems 
adequate? 
Recently, in In re Irving A. Horns Farms, Inc.,65 a Chapter 11 
case, the bankruptcy court answered this question by granting the 
motion to lift the stay and stating: "It is not the Court's duty to 
fashion adequate protection."66 In Horns the debtor did not make 
a specific adequate protection proposal; in other words, the debtor 
never offered any additional collateral or payments to compensate 
for the decreasing value of the creditor's interest in the debtor's 
property. Perhaps a court will be more willing to modify a debtor's 
adequate protection proposal. Indeed, a Utah bankruptcy court in 
In re Alyucan Interstate Corp. 67 relied on the word "modify" to 
suggest a more active role for the bankruptcy judge in section 
362(d)(l) litigation. The Alyucan court concluded: "This result 
[courts actively fashioning protection for creditors] may be inevita-
ble given the exigencies and informalities of relief from stay pro-
ceedings. Indeed it grows out of the language of section 362(d) 
which mandates relief such as 'modifying or conditioning' the 
stay."6s 
A number of arguments support the proposition that, at least 
in Chapter 13 cases, the bankruptcy court should take a more ac-
tive role in adequate protection litigation. The differences in dollar 
amounts at stake suggest that often there will be differences in the 
quantity and quality of debtor representation in Chapter 11 and 
This section [section 361] specifies the means by which adequate protection may be 
provided . . . . [but, to avoid] plac[ing] the court in an administrative role[,] . . . does 
not require the court to provide it .... Instead, the trustee or debtor in possession [or 
the creditor] will provide or propose a protection method. If the party that is affected 
by the proposed action objects, the court will determine whether the protection pro-
vided is adequate. 
Id. 
65. 42 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D. Iowa 1984). 
66. Id. at 838. 
67. 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
68. Id. at 809 n.12; see also In re Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr. 13, 17-18 (Bankr D. 
Nev. 1980) (court provided a number of specific terms and conditions for the debtor to meet 
in satisfying the "adequate protection" standard). 
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Chapter 13 cases. Should a Chapter 13 debtor lose her car because 
the general practitioner representing her is unaware that American 
Mariner means that adequate protection payments must cover 
both depreciation and opportunity costs even though the debtor is 
able and willing to make such payments? Moreover, the Bank-
ruptcy Code suggests that the court take a more active role in 
Chapter 13 cases: a Chapter 11 plan is reviewed and passed on by 
both creditors and the bankruptcy court, but a Chapter 13 plan is 
reviewed and passed on only by the bankruptcy judge. 
B. Section 362( d) (2) 
Section 362(d)(2) provides an alternative basis for relief from 
the automatic stay. A secured creditor is entitled to relief from the 
stay if it can either establish "cause" under section 362(d)(l) or 
satisfy the requirements of section 362(d)(2).69 The issues under 
section 362(d)(2) are whether the debtor has any equity in the en-
cumbered property and whether the encumbered property is "nec-
essary to an effective reorganization." 
1. Applicability of Section 362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 Cases 
No court has questioned whether section 362(d)(J) applies in 
Chapter 13 cases. Several courts, however, have refused to apply 
section 362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 cases.70 In refusing to apply section 
362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 cases, the courts have looked to the word 
"reorganization'' in section 362(d)(2)(B). "Reorganization" is the 
term used for the title of Chapter 11. While there can be a rehabil-
itation or debt adjustment in Chapter 13, there cannot be "reor-
ganization." These courts thus have reasoned that section 
362(d)(2) only applies in Chapter 11 cases.71 
Legislative history also provides some support for the view 
that section 362(d)(2) does not apply in Chapter 13 cases.72 This 
subsection was inserted by the Senate during its deliberations on 
69. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984). But cf. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 811 n.17 
(Bankr. Utah 1981). 
70. See, e.g., In re Youngs, 7 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Feimster, 3 
Bankr. 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979). 
71. See Youngs, 7 Bankr. at 69; Feimster, 3 Bankr. at 11. 
72. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5787, 5839. There is also some postenactment legislative history. Richard Levin, "a 
principal drafter of the Code," has indicated that § 3612(d)(2) should apply only in Chapter 
11 cases. Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 637, 648 nn. 65-66 (1983). 
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. As originally drafted, section 
362( d) (2) stated, "property is not necessary to an effective reorgan-
ization of the debtor if it is real property in which no business is 
being conducted by the debtor other than the business of operat-
ing the real property and the activities incident thereto."73 This 
draft suggests that Congress was concerned about business cases. 
Because Chapter 13 cases normally do not involve businesses, it 
can be argued that this draft implies that Congress did not intend 
section 362(d)(2) to apply to Chapter 13. 
Notwithstanding the statutory language, the legislative his-
tory, and the problems of applying the statute,7" the majority view 
is that section 362(d)(2) does apply to Chapter 13 cases.715 The ma-
jority view cases have relied primarily on section 103(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which makes all of Chapter 3 applicable in 
Chapter 13 cases. 76 
2. What is "Necessary" 
As previously mentioned, before granting relief from the auto-
matic stay under section 362(d)(2), the court must determine that 
the property at issue is not "necessary" to an effective reorganiza-
tion. "Necessary" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and may 
have a different meaning in Chapter 11 cases than it has in Chap-
ter 13 cases. The rest of this section explores the foundation of 
these different meanings. 
Assume that ACME, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 petition. At the 
time of the filing, the airline had sixty-six planes. S, a creditor with 
73. Id. (emphasis added). 
At least one bankruptcy court has based its conclusion that § 362(d)(2)(B) has no appli-
cation to Chapter 13 cases on policy grounds. In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1981). The bankruptcy court reasoned tbat because § 362(g) shifts the burden of proof to 
the debtor on the issue of the property's necessity and because the debtor rarely could prove 
the necessity of nonincome producing property, applying § 362(d)(2) conflicts with the re-
medial purpose of Chapter 13. In reversing this holding in In re Garner, 18 Bankr. 369, 370-
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the district court stated tbat the "necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion" standard must have an entirely different meaning in rehabilitation cases. The district 
court found that the "stay against foreclosure on residential property might be lifted where 
the debtor's present assets or prospects and the plan would not suffer materially." Id. at 
371; see also Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in Behav-
ioral Economics, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 281, 320 (noting the problems in applying the "neces-
sary'' standard to residential property). 
74. See supra note 73. 
75. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); see also H. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 55-
56 (1982). 
76. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1982); see In re Garner, 18 Bankr. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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a lien on seven of the planes, files a motion requesting relief from 
the stay under section 362(d)(2). Should the bankruptcy court 
wrestle with the question of whether ACME needs all sixty-six 
planes, in other words, whether it can reorganize with only fifty-
nine planes? 
To date, bankruptcy courts have not dealt with such questions 
in reported Chapter 11 cases. Instead, the courts seem to assume 
that a Chapter 11 debtor has discretion in choosing which property 
to use in its reorganization effort. Consider, for example, In re 
Mickler,11 a Chapter 11 case involving a request to lift the stay on 
raw land that the debtor occasionally used for farming and cattle 
grazing. In denying the creditor's motion, the court stated: 
Although the Court is not overly persuaded by the Debtors' need to use the 
subject property . . . the Court is persuaded that . . . the Debtors should be 
able to select the assets that should be sold and which to retain so long as the 
rights of the parties are not significantly impaired and their interest is ade-
quately protected.78 
Other courts have suggested that, in business reorganization cases, 
"necessary" simply means income producing or income related. 79 
Under this latter test, a creditor with a lien on one of ACME's 
planes could obtain relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2) 
only for those planes that ACME is not using. 
Another issue bankruptcy courts must address in Chapter 11 
section 362{d)(2) litigation is whether section 1121(b) requires that 
the court delay 120 days before making any 362(d)(2) determina-
tions. Under section 1121(b), only the debtor can file a plan during 
the first 120 days of the Chapter 11 case. An early judicial determi-
nation that property is not necessary to an effective reorganization 
would seem inconsistent with this period of exclusivity. 
Bankruptcy courts have been willing to question a Chapter 13 
consumer debtor's claim that encumbered property is necessary. 
For example, in In re Jones,80 the court granted Chrysler Credit 
Corporation's motion to lift the stay so that it could reposses the 
debtor's 1976 Chevrolet Monte Carlo. The debtor owed $2546 to 
Chrysler on the car, which had a value of $1500 to $1800. The 
court concluded that the debtor had failed to show that the auto-
mobile was necessary "having found that public transportation and 
77. 13 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). 
78. Id. at 633. 
79. See, e.g., In re Kane, 27 Bankr. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983); In re Classics Print-
ers, Inc., 24 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
80. 7 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). 
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his stepfather's automobile are available to Debtor."81 
Most of the reported Chapter 13 cases under section 362(d)(2) 
involve home mortgages.82 In some of these cases, the courts ana-
lyzed "necessary" by determining whether the property is essential 
to the debtor's production of income. These courts concluded that 
a house used solely as a residence is never necessary.83 Other courts 
summarily conclude that, so long as the house is used as the 
debtor's residence, it is "necessary."84 
Recently, in In re Gregory,85 the bankruptcy court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee had to decide the meaning of "neces-
sary" as applied to a debtor's home in a Chapter 11 case. The 
debtors in Gregory were wage earning consumers who filed for 
Chapter 11 relief "to save our house." By filing under Chapter 11 
rather than Chapter 13, the debtors hoped to propose a plan that 
would restructure their home mortgage payments. 86 Before a plan 
was filed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as 
mortgage holder filed a motion requesting relief from the auto-
matic stay. The debtors offered monthly payments of $500 to the 
FDIC. The parties stipulated that the debtors had no equity in the 
encumbered property, that the debtors offer of $500 monthly pay-
ments was adequate protection, and that comparable housing was 
available for $350 a month. Under these facts, the bankruptcy 
court held that the property was not necessary to an effective 
reorganization. 
In arriving at this holding, the Gregory court stated that 
though residential property does not have to be directly related to 
the production of income to be held "necessary" within the con-
templation of section 362(d)(2), the debtor must nonetheless prove 
a genuine need for the property. Thus, if the court finds that a 
rented apartment meets the debtor's Chapter 11 needs, the house 
81. Id. at 142. 
82. See generally Zaretsky, Commentary, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in 
Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433 (1984) (discussing two recent Second Circuit cases 
concerning Chapter 13 debtors and secured mortgage creditors that have upheld a policy of 
debtor protection); Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1983) (exploring Chapter 13 home foreclosure issues). 
83. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 21 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Stewart, 11 
Bankr. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Roselli, 10 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). 
84. See, e.g., In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Gamer, 13 
Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), atf'd on other grounds, 18 Bankr. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 
see also H. SOMMER, supra note 75, at 55-56. 
85. 39 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). 
86. Section 1322(b)(2) of Chapter 13 forbids the modification of a "security interest in 
real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 
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is not necessary. The Gregory opinion requires that the bank-
ruptcy court balance the costs and determine whether other living 
arrangements are fungible with the debtor's needs. 87 
The Gregory approach of testing the debtor's minimum living 
requirements arguably finds further support in a 1984 amendment 
to Chapter 13-section 1325(b). Under this section, a Chapter 13 
debtor who proposes a composition plan must commit all of her 
"disposable income" to the repayment of prepetition debts.88 Forc-
ing a Chapter 13 debtor to give up her home if there "is a less costly 
housing alternative increases the disposable income available to 
satisfy creditors' claims. 
While Gregory was not a Chapter 13 case, the court looked to 
Chapter 13 case authority and seemed to suggest an approach to 
use in both Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 consumer cases.89 If "nec-
essary" is to be given a different meaning in different kinds of 
cases, it is more reasonable to classify cases on a "consumer 
debtor/business debtor" basis rather than on a "Chapter 11 case/ 
Chapter 13 case" basis. 
VI. CLASSIFICATION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR" CLAIMS 
Both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 have one critical point in 
common: they both use a plan that determines the amount and 
form of distribution to various creditors. Both chapters provide 
that the plan can classify claims90 and pay some classes of claims 
87. See 39 Bankr. at 411. The opinion provides: 
This court believes that a debtor's home is necessary to an effective reorganization only 
if the property is not fungible with other living arrangements meeting the debtor's 
minimum living requirements ..•• Measuring fungibility against the debtor's mini-
mum living requirements is consistent with the congressional use of the word "neces-
sary" and allocates the burden to the debtors to demonstrate genuine need for the 
property. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
88. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)). 
89. 39 Bankr. at 410. Some language in Riggs Nat'! Bank v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 985 
(4th Cir. 1984), suggests that§ 362(d) should apply only to "real property mortgage foreclo-
sures." This suggestion is based on legislative history. For a concise, yet complete, consider-
ation of the legislative history of§ 362(d)(2), see Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New 
Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MrcH. JL. REF. 3, 45'-4§_{1978). 
90. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1322(b)(l) (1982). See generally Anderson, Classification of 
Claims and Interests in Reorganization Cases Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 99 (1984) (discussing the development of concepts governing classification of 
claims under prior reorganization law and relating their applicability to the 1978 Code); 
Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
197 (1984) (formulating a standard of classification for § 1122); Epstein, Chapter 13: Its 
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more and sooner than others. Cases under both chapters place se-
cured claims in separate classes. Both chapters also require that 
unsecured claims which are not "substantially similar" be placed 
in different classes. Neither chapter, however, clearly indicates 
whether unsecured claims that are "substantially similar" can be 
placed in different classes. This part of the Article focuses on the 
specific classification issue of the limits on a Chapter 11 or Chapter 
13 debtor's discretion in placing unsecured claims in different clas-
ses. More specifically, when a debtor's plan provides for more than 
one class of unsecured claims, whether it has to establish that the 
unsecured claims in each of the classes are different somehow from 
the unsecured claims in the other classes. 
A. Differences in the Significance of Classification of Claims in 
Chapter 11and13 
While many classification characteristics and questions are 
common to Chapters 11 and 13, the two chapters contain differ-
ences in the significance attached to the classification of claims. In 
Chapter 11, the classification of claims can affect not only what 
creditors receive under a plan but whether a plan can successfully 
pass through the approval process contemplated by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Both creditors and the bankruptcy judge are involved 
in this approval process. 
Creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor receive a copy of a disclosure 
statement containing "adequate information" about the plan. The 
creditors then have the opportunity to vote on the plan.91 To de-
termine whether a sufficient number of creditors have accepted the 
plan, the votes are counted by class-"two-thirds in amount and 
more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such 
class."92 If the requisite majority of the class accepts the plan, all 
holders of claims within the class are bound by the vote. 93 At least 
one class of claims must vote to accept the plan.94 When one class 
accepts the plan but one or more classes dissent, the bankruptcy 
Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of Unsecured 
Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980) (discussing the general operation of 
Chapter 13); Given and Phillips, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder-Classification of 
Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 735 (1982) (discussing 
the criteria used for classifying claims within the context of corporate reorganization). 
91. 11 u.s.c. § 1126 (1982). 
92. Id. § 1126(c) (emphasis added). 
93. Id. § 1141(a). 
94. Id. § 1129(a)(10). 
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judge may apply section 1129(b) and force the plan on the dissent-
ing classes. Before effecting this "cram-down," the court must find 
that the plan is "fair and equitable" with respect to each dissent-
ing class and does not "discriminate unfairly" against any dissent-
ing class. 
In contrast, Chapter 13 creditors do not vote on the plan, and 
the tests the judge applies in confirming a plan focus on individual 
claims rather than classes of claims. Accordingly, classification has 
a different and greater significance in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 
13. In Chapter 11, and only Chapter 11, a debtor might try to clas-
sify claims to manipulate the creditor acceptance process. If a 
Chapter 11 debtor, D, believes that creditors X and Y will reject 
any plan that provides for less than full payment, D might try to 
place X's claim and Y's claim in different classes and include a 
sufficient number of "friendly creditors" in each class to meet the 
approval standards of section 1126. This problem is unique to 
Chapter 11. 
B. Code Provisions 
As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly deal 
with the question of whether a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 plan can 
place similar unsecured claims in different classes. 
Section 1122 governs classification in Chapter 11 plans. Sec-
tion 1122(b) authorizes the segregation of all small claims into a 
single class if "reasonable and necessary for administrative conve-
nience. "915 Section 1122(a) provides the general test for determining 
whether a claim can be included within a class: all claims within a 
class must be "substantially similar" to other claims in that class. 
Paragraph (a) does not provide any test for determining whether a 
claim must be included within a class. No language in section 1122 
limits the discretion of the drafter of the plan in placing "substan-
tially similar" claims in different classes. 96 
95. Id. § 1122(b). Typically, a Chapter 11 plan provides for full cash payment of all 
claims of X dollars or less. Thus, this class of claims is unimpaired by reason of § 1124(3) 
and is conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan under § 1126(f). Furthermore, 
§ 1126(f) excuses the debtor from sending disclosure statements to and soliciting plan ac-
ceptances from the creditors in that class. 
96. To illustrate, assume that X, Y, and Z are creditors of Chapter 11 debtor, D. If D's 
Chapter 11 plan places all three creditors' claims in the same class, § 1122(a) controls. It is 
clear from § 1122(a) that D cannot place the claims of X, Y, Z in a single class unless all 
three claims are "substantially similar"-whatever that means. If, however, D's Chapter 11 
plan places each creditor's claim in a separate class, § 1122(a) does not control. What limits 
D's discretion in placing claims in separate classes is not clear from § 1122(a). 
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Section 1322 governs classification of unsecured claims in 
Chapter 13 plans. Section 1322(b)(l) expressly incorporates section 
1122 and adds the requirement that the plan "may not discrimi-
nate unfairly against any class so designated." Section 1122 con-
tains no "discriminates unfairly" test. This phrase, however, does 
appear in section 1129(b), but this "discriminates unfairly" test 
only applies in Chapter 11 cases that have a dissenting class.97 
The effect of the "discriminates unfairly" test on a debtor's 
discretion in placing "substantially similar" claims in different 
classes raises a further question. If a debtor's Chapter 13 plan 
places the claims of different unsecured creditors in different clas-
ses and provides for different treatment to each class, the plan is 
obviously discriminatory with respect to these claims-ls that level 
of discrimination unfair? 
C. Case Law Under the 1898 Act 
Some legislative history suggests that claims classification 
cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 will be helpful in answer-
ing claims classification questions under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code is identical to section 1122 of 
H.R. 8200. According to the House committee report that accom-
panied H.R. 8200, "[t]his sectio_n codifies current case law sur-
rounding the classification of claims."98 
Chapter XIII of the 1898 Act was the predecessor to Chapter 
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, there is no case law 
"surrounding the classification of claims" under Chapter XIII of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 because Chapter XIII did not provide 
for the classification of claims. Section 646 of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 required that the Chapter XIII plan deal with unsecured 
claims "generally,"99 and "generally" was commonly interpreted to 
require pro rata payment to all unsecured creditors.100 
Chapters X, XI, and XII were the forerunners of Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Although each of these chapters permit-
ted classification of claims, there was very little litig~tion or sec-
ondary writing about classification of claims.101 Furthermore, each 
97. See supra text following note 94. 
98. H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & An. NEWS 5963, 6363; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5787, 5904. 
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1046 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
100. See 3 D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1127, at 433 (2d ed. 1978). 
101. See Note, Classification of Claims in Debtor Proceedings, 49 YALE L.J. 881 
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of these chapters contained differences in their classification provi-
sions that prevent them from being completely analogous to Chap-
ter 11. 
Section 197102 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained the 
classification criteria for Chapter X and provided, in part: "For the 
purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the judge shall fix the di-
vision of creditors and stockholders into classes according to the 
nature of their respective claims and stock. "103 Section 197 of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, unlike section 1122 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, gave the bankruptcy court independent power to designate 
classes. The bankruptcy judge cannot classify claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code. The present court's only control over classifica-
tion of claims is to withhold confirmation under section 1129(a)(l) 
when the classification in the plan does not comply with the appli-
cable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, the general 
operation of Chapter X was similar to Chapter 11. In Chapter X, 
like Chapter 11, creditors voted by class on the plan;10' in Chapter 
X, unlike Chapter 11, the court appointed a trustee in every 
case.105 
Section 357(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided 
the classification scheme for Chapter XI, stated that a Chapter XI 
plan could include provisions for "the division of such debts into 
classes and the treatment thereof in different ways or upon differ-
ent terms."106 Section 357 thus omitted the "nature of their respec-
tive claims" language found in section 197. The general operation 
of Chapter XI was similar to Chapter 11. In Chapter XI, like 
Chapter 11, creditors voted on the plan by class;107 in Chapter XI, 
unlike Chapter 11, only the debtor could propose or modify the 
plan.106 A Chapter XI debtor thus could negotiate for creditor ap-
proval of its plan on the basis of "accept on these terms or it's 
liquidation." · 
Section 452 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided 
the classification scheme for Chapter XII, permitted classification 
of Chapter XII creditors "according to the nature of their respec-
(1940). For a complete discussion of the Bankruptcy Act classification cases, see Vihon, 
Classification of Unsecured Claims: Squaring the Circle, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 113 (1978). · 
102. 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. § 579 (repealed 1978). 
105. Id. § 556 (repealed 1978). 
106. Id. § 757 (repealed 1978). 
107. Id. § 762 (repealed 1978). 
108. Id. § 706(1) (repealed 1978). 
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tive claims. "109 Therefore, the Chapter XII classification language, 
like the Chapter X classification language, included the "nature of 
their respective claims" limitation. Chapter XII, however, could be 
used only when the primary purpose of the reorganization was the 
modification of the rights of creditors whose claims were secured 
by real property:110 accordingly, classification of unsecured claims 
generally was not an issue in Chapter XII cases. m 
None of the various statutory standards for classification of 
claims under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 expressly deals with the 
limits that govern a debtor's decision to separate claims into differ-
ent classes. Reported decisions under the 1898 Act, however, do 
speak to this issue. A number of these cases apply the test from 
the early Bankruptcy Act case of In re Hudson-Ross, Inc., 112-any 
differences in treatment of unsecured claims must be just and rea-
sonably necessary to effectuate the plan.113 
In one of the last 1898 Act cases on classification, In re Win-
ston Mills, Inc., 114 the bankruptcy court followed a more liberal 
approach to classification. The Winston Mills opinion describes 
the classification process as a "product of delicate negotations tak-
ing place in the dialogue between a debtor and its creditors."m 
The court reasoned that the requirement that a plan be accepted 
by a statutory majority of the creditors in each class afforded the 
separate classes sufficient protection. The court, however, specifi-
cally noted that the classification scheme was not invidious, thus 
suggesting some minimum level of review was appropriate. 116 The 
Winston Mills opinion concludes with the observation that the 
same approach to classification should and would be taken under 
109. Id. § 852 (repealed 1978). 
110. Id. § 806 (repealed 1978). 
111. See generally w. NORTON, REAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS 67-69 (1977). 
112. 175 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
113. See, e.g., In re Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D. Fla., 1971); In re Jaco 
Fabrics, BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1301 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1978). 
114. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2n (MB) 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
115. Id. at 127. 
116. Id. at 128. The opinion provides: 
What emerges plainly from the appraisal of the Chapter XI symmetry is that a debtor's 
plan is the product of delicate negotiations taking place in the dialogue between a 
debtor and its creditors .... It is not unknown, therefore, that a debter will deal with 
its trade creditors in one way, its union creditors in another, its institutional debt in 
still another and so on. It is up to the debtor and all its creditors to decide the extent 
to which the good graces of the trade creditors or the union will be needed if the reha-
bilitated debtor is to survive as a viable commercial entity •..• 
Id. at 127-28. 
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the Bankruptcy Code. 117 While the court's reliance on negotiations 
between the debtor and the creditor to control most classification 
abuses arguably is appropriate in Chapter 11 cases, such reliance· 
does not seem applicable to Chapter 13 cases. Because Chapter 13 
has no provision for creditor voting, the plan in Chapter 13 cases is 
far less likely to be the "product of delicate negotiations." 
D. Case Law Under the Bankruptcy Code 
Since the Bankruptcy Code became effective on October 1, 
1979, few reported Chapter 11 cases have discussed the classifica-
tion of unsecured claims issue. Several cases, however, denied con-
firmation of Chapter 11 plans because the plans placed unsecured 
claims in separate classes. One circuit court also has offered some 
dicta on this issue. 
The plan in In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 118 divided 
unsecured claims into three classes: (1) claims under $20,000, (2) 
claims over $20,000, and (3) disputed claims. The plan treated the 
over $20,000 class and the under $20,000 class identically. In re-
viewing the adequacy of this plan, the court first found that the 
classification scheme failed to meet the requirements of section 
1122(b) because it did not pay in full the claims under $20,000. 
The court next analyzed section 1122(a) and noted that its concern 
with placing similar claims in the same class carried with it the 
negative implication that similar claims normally should not be 
placed in different classes. Because it viewed all general unsecured 
claims as similar, the court denied confirmation of the plan. The 
Mastercraft opinion concludes this analysis by stating: "Classifica-
tion cannot be used to divide like claims into multiple classes in 
order to create a consenting class so as to permit confirmation. "119 
In In re S & W Enterprise,120 the Chapter 11 plan placed all 
unsecured claims of less than $1000 in a separate class. There were 
two claims in this class; there was only one unsecured claim of 
more than $1000. In rejecting confirmation of the plan, the court 
focused on the "reasonable and necessary" requirement in section 
1122(b). The court also noted by way of dictum that "the manipu-
lation of unsecured claims . . . for the sole purpose of complying 
with the voting requirement of section 1129(a)(10) shall not be 
117. Id. at 128. 
118. 32 Bankr. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 39 Bankr. 654 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
119. 32 Bankr. at 108. 
120. 11 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 630 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). 
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tolerated. "121 
The First Circuit, in Granada Wines, Inc. v. New England 
Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund,122 reviewed a 
bankruptcy court's order requiring the Chapter 11 debtor to pay to 
the appellee pension fund the same percentage as all other un-
secured creditors. Although the plan had not placed the pension 
fund claim in a separate class, the debtor argued that the claim 
should be treated as if it were in a separate class and receive a 
reduced payment. In rejecting this argument, the First Circuit con-
sidered when unsecured claims can be placed in separate classes. 
Relying on case law under the 1898 Act, the court concluded: "Sep-
arate classifications for unsecured creditors are only justified 
'where the legal character of their claims is such as to accord them 
a status different from other unsecured creditors.' "123 
In Mastercraft, S & W, and Granada Wines, the courts were 
concerned with classification being used to manipulate the creditor 
voting requirements. In a sense, these cases present the easy classi-
fication issue-can a debtor base its classification on voting consid-
eration.124 Clearly, a debtor should not be able to gerrymander 
classification for voting purposes. (Remember that this will not be 
an issue in Chapter 13 cases). What the limitations on classifica-
tion of claims are when there is no vote manipulations issue or 
concern remains unclear. 
While there have only been a few reported Chapter 11 cases 
on classification, there are numerous reported Chapter 13 cases.1215 
Two of the 1984 amendments to the Code, however, limit the prec-
edential value· of many of these cases. First, section 1322(b)(l) now 
expressly and specifically empowers a debtor to place debts that 
have a codebtor in a separate class. A Chapter 13 debtor who is 
proposing something less than full payment on all unsecured debts 
often will place any cosigned debts in a separate class and provide 
for full payment to that class. The section 1301 automatic stay 
against collection from codebtors on consumer debts is operative 
only to the extent that the debt is to be paid under the plan. If the 
121. Id. at 634. 
122. 748 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1984). 
123. Id. at 46 (quoting In re Los Angeles Land and lnvs. Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 454 
(1968), atf'd, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971) (an example of such a claim is a tax claim)). 
124. See generally Given & Phillips, supra note 90, at 735, 749-50 (arguing that courts 
must consider the voting power of claimants when reviewing classification schemes). 
125. See generally H. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 9.05 (1981). 
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plan provides for less than full payment, the creditor may obtain 
relief from the stay and proceed against the codebtor. Most of the 
reported Chapter 13 classification cases concern debtor's efforts to 
place cosigned debts in a separate class-a nonissue after the 1984 
amendments. 
Second, section 1325(b) now requires that a Chapter 13 debtor 
who proposes a composition plan to her creditors commit all of her 
disposable income to the Chapter 13 plan. This amendment ad-
dresses a concern of some segments of the consumer credit indus-
try that debtors were obtaining the substantial benefits of Chapter 
13 while making insubstantial payments to creditors.126 
Section 1325(b) probably will not prevent low or zero payment 
plans to unsecured creditors in all cases. Unlike earlier propos-
als,127 section 1325(b) focuses on the amount that the debtor keeps 
for herself, rather than the amount that the creditor receives. If all 
of a debtor's income were "necessary to be expended for the main-
tenance or support of the debtor," such a debtor would have no 
disposable income and could file a zero payment plan and still 
comply with section 1325(b). 
Although section 1325(b) may not have the intended effect of 
precluding Chapter 13 plans that propose low or no payment on 
unsecured claims, it may have an unintended effect on the ap-
proach that some courts take to the classification of claims issue. 
Previously, some court adopted the position that they should not 
impose restrictions on the discretion exercised by a Chapter 13 
debtor in classifying claims. These courts reasoned that so long as 
a creditor receives as much as it would receive in a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation case, it cannot complain because other creditors are receiv-
ing more.128 The courts derived this conclusion from section 
1325(a)(4)'s requirement that creditors receive no less than the 
amount they would have received under Chapter 7 before the court 
could confirm a Chapter 13 plan. 
Section 1325(b) undermines whatever limited validity this po-
sition had. Since in Chapter 13, a debtor is now statutorily obli-
126. Shortly after the Bankruptcy Code became effective, a number of bankruptcy 
judges confirmed Chapter 13 plans that provided for low or no payments to unsecured 
claims. See, e.g., In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 
Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). 
127. See generally Ginsburg, The Bankruptcy Improvement Act-An Update, 3 N. 
ILL. u. L. REV. 235, 248 (1983). 
128. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 28 Bankr. 74, 76 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1982), aff'd sub 
nom. Public Fin. Corp. v. Freeman, 28 Bankr. 77 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd in part, 712 F.2d 219 
(5th Cir. 1983); Jn re Sutherland, 3 Bankr. 420, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980). 
930 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:901 
gated to devote all of her disposable income to her plan, a creditor 
is disadvantaged if another creditor receives a greater part of this 
disposable income. 
Even though the 1984 amendments affect the precedential 
value of the holdings of many pre-1984 Chapter 13 classification 
cases, the opinion in In re Kovich129 and a number of later cases 
suggest an approach to placing unsecured claims in separate clas-
ses that merits consideration in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 
cases. When reviewing the debtor's classifications the court in Ko-
vich considered the following four questions: (1) Is there a reasona-
ble basis for the classification? (2) Is the debtor able to perform a 
plan without the classification? (3) Has the debtor acted in good 
faith in classifying claims? ( 4) How is the claim discriminated 
against being treated?130 In essence, Kovich recognizes that the 
classification of claims presents the classic balancing issue: benefit 
versus detriment. Any bankruptcy court facing a classification is-
sue should balance the extent to which the classification might 
help the debtor perform under the plan against the extent to which 
the classification disadvantages any class. 
129. 4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980). 
130. Id. at 407. 
